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Abstract

This paper develops a general framework under
Dempster-Shafer theory for assessing fraud risk in a
financial statement audit by integrating the evidence
pertaining to the presence of fraud triangle factors
(incentives, attitude and opportunities), and evidence
concerning both account-based and evidence-based
fraud schemes. This framework extends fraud risk
assessment models in prior research in three respects.
1) It integrates fraud schemes, both account schemes
through which accounts are manipulated, and evidence
schemes through which frauds are concealed, into a
single framework. 2) It incorporates prior fraud
frequency information obtained from the Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission into an evidential
network which uses Conditional OR relationships
among assertions. 3) The framework provides a
structured approach for connecting risk assessment,
audit planning, and evaluation of audit results. The
paper uses a real fraud case to illustrate the
application of the framework.

1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to develop a
general framework for assessing the risk of fraud
committed by management in reporting the financial
performance of a company using the evidential
reasoning approach under Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory
of belief functions. In more specific terms, the objective
of the paper is to develop a general framework for
assessing fraud risk using an evidential reasoning
approach by integrating fraud triangle factors
(Incentives, Attitude, and Opportunities which must be
present for management to commit fraud) with fraud
schemes (schemes through which management
perpetrates fraud). In addition, this study incorporates
both the account-based fraud schemes and evidencebased fraud schemes into the fraud risk assessment
framework. Account-based fraud schemes are used by
management to manipulate account balances, while
evidence-based fraud schemes are used to deceive
auditors and conceal fraud [11] by creating bogus
evidence or manipulating evidence by colluding with
customers. In addition, the framework integrates
frequency information of fraud schemes obtained from
previous fraud cases disclosed by the SEC to help
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improve the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud
detection.
In recent years, management fraud has drawn
heightened attention from all sectors of the economy
due to the occurrence of fraud in several major public
companies [20, 43].. Simultaneously, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants released SAS
99 [2] to replace SAS 82 [1] on consideration of fraud
in financial statement audits. The new standard
emphasizes the importance of evaluating fraud risk
from the view of the three fraud triangle factors and
the use of brainstorming sessions to assess fraud risk
and evaluate how fraud could be perpetrated.
However, SAS 99 does not provide detailed guidance
on how auditors should consider fraud schemes in risk
assessment or how auditors should adjust audit
programs to respond to the assessed fraud risk.
The present study uses a real fraud case to
illustrate the application of the framework and
demonstrates how to make preliminary fraud risk
assessments, how to plan audit programs, how to
aggregate and evaluate audit evidence, and how to
make a final assessment of fraud risk.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews prior literature. Section 3 presents a
general evidential reasoning framework for fraud risk
assessment. Section 4 uses a real fraud case to
illustrate how auditors may use evidential diagrams to
perform fraud risk assessment, to plan audit programs,
and to evaluate audit results. Section 5 concludes with
a discussion of contributions and future research.

2. Prior research
Since this paper deals with both the application of
an evidential reasoning approach under DS theory and
the fraud risk assessment process, we provide a brief
literature review in both areas. The evidential
reasoning approach presented is a structured approach
where decisions are made based on the evidence
available and uncertainties in the evidence are
modeled using DS theory [16]. This approach has
been used in many disciplines from multiple-attribute
decision making with uncertainty [43, 44] to
information security [38] and WebTrust services [34].
Srivastava and his co-authors have applied this
approach to auditing and assurance services [18, 31,
37]. We apply this approach to assess the risk of fraud
committed by management.
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Prior studies on fraud risk assessment focus largely
on using fraud risk factors and “red flags” to assess the
overall risk of fraudulent financial reporting. In this
approach, which has been adopted in SAS 99 [2], the
auditor identifies the presence of red flags and then
assesses the risk of fraud [5; 8, 9, 23].
To facilitate the use of red flags, various decision
aids have been developed including checklists,
regression models and expert systems. Although the
checklist is the most common decision aid, it may be
ineffective [23]. Prior research finds that regression
models perform better than a simple checklist and that
expert systems perform better than either checklists or
regression models [5; 8]. One potential limitation of
such approaches is that they assess fraud risk without
considering the impact of evidence concerning fraud
schemes which are used by management to perpetrate
and conceal fraud.
Prior fraud research using other approaches such as
neural network [13] and strategic auditing where the
audit process is treated as if it were a game, with auditors and
management functioning as the players [6, 21] are also

restricted to the assessment of fraud risk without
considering the impact of fraud schemes. Thus, even if
the auditor correctly identifies a high-fraud-risk
situation, the auditor may not design effective fraud
detection procedures because he or she is misled by
manipulated evidence provided by management. It may
be helpful for auditors to consider how fraud can be
perpetrated and concealed. To consider this possibility,
this study integrates the assessment and tests of fraud
schemes into the process of fraud risk assessment with
the objective of improving effectiveness of fraud
detection.
As mentioned earlier, the proposed framework uses
the DS Theory of Belief Functions as the formalism for
defining and managing uncertainties involved in the
audit evidence. Several studies suggest that Belief
Functions provide a useful framework for mapping
uncertainties and ambiguity in the audit judgment
process [7, 14, 26]. We assume that readers have a
basic understanding of DS theory and thus do not
provide an introduction to the theory. However, for a
detailed introduction, we encourage readers to see [29,
33, 37].

3. A general evidential diagram for fraud
risk assessment
This paper uses an evidential reasoning approach to
develop a framework for assessing fraud risk and to
facilitate audit planning. Under this approach, an
auditor assesses the status of assertions based on partial
knowledge about a variable of interest such as a
material account balance in the financial statement and
knowledge about other variables or assertions that are
related to the particular account balance variable [22.
39].
Figure 1 presents a general evidential diagram for
assessing fraud risk. The oval-shaped boxes represent
assertions and sub-assertions, the rectangular boxes
represent items of audit evidence, and circles represent

relational nodes connected to assertions and subassertions. Dotted lines are used to represent those
assertions or items of evidence that could have been
connected to related assertions but were omitted in the
diagram for simplification. As constructed, Figure 1
indicates that the assessment as to whether fraud is
present in Account A depends on five general types of
evidence: results of analytical procedures, the
evaluation of the fraud triangle factors, evidence about
general account schemes and specific account
schemes, and evidence about specific evidence
schemes.
At the left is the main variable being investigated,
specifically whether material fraud is or is not present
in a particular financial account. This variable is
evaluated in the form of an assertion – fraud is present
in Account A. The expectation in most audits is that
collected audit evidence will disconfirm this assertion.
The assertion nodes include different levels of
assertions where sub-assertions are connected to the
main assertion through relational nodes. In Figure 1,
all relationships are assumed to be ‘Conditional OR’
or ‘CR’. Srivastava, Gao, and Gillett [32] have
modeled “Conditional OR (CR)” under DS theory for
propagating beliefs in a network of variables. Under
this relationship, the sub-assertions in a network of
variables are related to the main assertion through
“OR” logic, i.e., if any of the sub-assertions is true
then the main assertion is true. In the case of fraud,
this is the logical relationship between the various
fraud schemes and the main fraud objective. That is,
fraud will occur if any of the fraud schemes such as
the recording of fictitious revenues are evident.
However, the reverse relationship is conditioned
upon historical frequency evidence. For example, if
fraud is suspected, i.e., there is evidence that fraud has
occurred but where it has occurred may not be known;
it may depend upon the most likely fraud schemes that
management in the past has found easy to perpetrate
and conceal it from the auditor. Evidence nodes (the
rectangular nodes) provide the evidence that the
auditor collects to assess the level of support in favor
of or against the corresponding assertions or subassertions.
Under the belief-function framework, items of
audit evidence are combined using Dempster’s rule
[25]. We use the Shenoy and Shafer [27] “local
computation” technique for propagating beliefs at each
assertion and sub-assertion in the evidential diagram
to determine the overall belief at each node in the
network.
In Figure 1 there are three levels of sub-assertions
beyond the main assertion. The first level indicates the
general account schemes that have been used to
commit fraud. The second assertion level indicates the
specific account schemes that have been used and the
third assertion level identifies specific evidence
schemes used to conceal fraud.

4. Use of evidential reasoning approach
in fraud risk assessment
Having completed the evidential diagram, the next
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step is to gather relevant evidence pertaining to various
assertions and sub-assertions to determine the overall
belief and plausibility whether the main assertion is
true, i.e., fraud is present in account A.
Under DS theory, the belief in fraud, Bel(fraud),
represents the total belief that fraud is present based on
the evidence. Bel(fraud) = 0 implies that we have no
evidence indicating that there is fraud. Also, Bel(no
fraud) = 0 implies that we have no evidence that there is
‘no fraud’; a situation of complete ignorance with
respect to the assertions being investigated. This may
be the situation when the auditor starts an audit
engagement for a new client; the auditor lacks evidence
in favor or in negation of assertions being true.
However, under the complete ignorance situation the
plausibility of fraud being present and not being present
is 1, that is Pl(fraud) = 1 and Pl(no fraud) = 1.
Consider another situation where the auditor has
very weak evidence that fraud is present, say at a belief
of 0.01 on a scale of 0-1, that is Bel(fraud) = 0.01, and
moderately strong evidence that fraud is not present say
at a belief of 0.6, that is Bel(no fraud) = 0.6. We
assume these belief values are based on the available
audit evidence. We provide several examples of such
items of evidence in Section 5.
Since Pl(A) = 1 – Bel(not A), given the above
values, Pl(fraud) = 0.4 and Pl(no fraud) = 0.99. Note
that while the evidence suggests that fraud is not
present with a belief of 0.6, it is plausible with degree
0.99 that there is no fraud. Similarly, the evidence
suggests that fraud is present with 0.01 belief, that is,
the auditor has direct evidence that fraud is present with
a low level of belief 0.01, while it is plausible that fraud
could be present with 0.4 degree on a scale of 0-1.
The above situation might arise when the auditor
identifies discrepancies in accounting records or
conflicting or missing evidential matter [2]. Based on
just this evidence, fraud is possible, although with only
a belief of 0.01, but with a plausibility of 0.4.
Next, we discuss how the assessed belief in fraud
and fraud risk should impact the audit process in terms
of further evidence collection. As the audit team is
investigating fraud risk, a strategy needs to be selected
concerning whether additional evidence needs to be
collected or whether this particular phase of the audit is
complete (that is, whether sufficient, competent
evidence has been obtained in order to reach a
conclusion). For the above situation where the
plausibility of fraud is 0.4, an appropriate strategy for a
skeptical auditor would be to investigate further until
either the additional evidence reduces the plausibility of
fraud, i.e., the fraud risk, to a much lower level or
indicates that belief in fraud surpasses a threshold, say
0.10. The plausibility of fraud, Pl(fraud), can be
interpreted as fraud risk under DS theory. This
interpretation is similar to the definition of audit risk as
suggested by Srivastava and Shafer [38].
In general, the objective of an audit of financial
statements is to determine, with reasonable assurance,
whether the financial statements are free from material
misstatements due to error or fraud. The auditor issues
an unqualified opinion if there is sufficient and
competent evidence that provide reasonable assurance

that the financial statements are free from material
misstatements due to error or fraud.
If plausibility is used as the benchmark for fraud
risk, this means that the auditor must have a
reasonably high level of belief, say 0.95, that there is
‘no fraud’ in the financial statements in order to give
an unqualified opinion. This implies that, for an
unqualified opinion, the plausibility that there is
‘fraud’ in the financial statements has to be reasonably
low, say 0.05. Plausibility will be equal to 0.05 if the
belief in ‘no fraud’ is 0.95, even though there may be
no or little evidence that fraud is present.
In Section 5, we demonstrate how items of
evidence can be combined with frequency information
of fraud schemes to determine the overall belief in
fraud, the overall belief in no fraud and the plausibility
of fraud.

5. An illustration of assessing belief in
fraud and fraud risk
To illustrate how auditors may use the evidential
diagram to assess fraud risk and plan audit programs, a
fraud case disclosed in AAERs by the SEC [40-43] is
used. The fraud was committed by the management of
FLIR Systems, Inc. (FLIR), a listed company
designing and manufacturing thermal imaging and
broadcast camera systems that detect infrared
radiation. According to the SEC’s releases, FLIR
engaged in a wide range of schemes to inflate revenue
and earnings in 1998 and 1999.
FLIR began its improper revenue recognition in
the first quarter of 1998 and continued each quarter to
overstate revenue by recognizing sham sales, improper
bill-and-hold sales, sales with contingent terms, and
sales without fixed commitment or price. Most of
these improper practices were carried out at the end of
each quarter.
Next, we illustrate how auditors may use the
evidential network to assess fraud risk through
assessing the presence of fraud triangle factors. We
then discuss how this assessment could be used to
further plan the audit, to collect and aggregate audit
evidence, and to assess the risk that material fraud has
been committed. Figure 2 (Step 1) presents the
evidential diagram for the fraud risk assessment based
on the assessment of the presence of incentives,
attitude, and opportunities to commit fraud in the
revenue account of FLIR based on the model
developed by [36]. The main assertion "Fraudulent
Revenue" in Figure 2 is logically connected with the
sub-assertions through an AND relationship because
for fraud to occur, there must be Incentive, Attitude
and Opportunity.
In the analysis we assume that evidence designated
‘E.Prior’ in Figure 2 (Step 1) is available from client
acceptance analysis and results in an assessment of the
belief that fraud is not present as 0.95 and the
plausibility of fraud to be less than or equal to 0.05.
We further assume that the prior belief in fraud equals
0.00. These assumptions are indicated in Figure 2
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(Step 1) as a prior of (0.0, 0.95). The belief masses
from the other nine items of evidence pertaining to the
corresponding variables are given in the respective
items of evidence. The first number represents the
belief that the variable is true and the second number
the belief that it is not true. These belief masses are
assumed judgment based on the details available from
the SEC description of the FLIR [39-41].
For example, we use the following information to
assess the presence of incentives to commit fraud.
Throughout 1998 and 1999, FLIR’s senior management
had established budgets that projected growth in FLIR's
results. The company’s actual earnings per share in
1998 generally met or exceeded analysts’ estimates, but
revenues did not [40]. Also, FLIR acquired AGEMA
Infrared Systems in December 1997 and merged with
Inframetrics, Inc. in March 1999. Both mergers
exacerbated the pressure on management to achieve
financial goals. Although these factors are certainly not
evidence of fraud, they are risk factors that indicate
incentives for management to commit fraud. We use the
above evidence pertaining to the fraud triangle factor
"incentive" and assess the strength of the evidence to be
0.05 for the evidence of pressures from mergers,
represented by E.T.2 in Figure 2 (Step 1); and 0.1 for
the evidence of earnings projection target and the
evidence of annual bonus based on pre-tax profit,
represented by E.T.1 and E.T.3 respectively in Figure 2
(Step 1). Details on the remaining risk factors and the
analysis of results from analytical procedures is
available from the authors.
All of the strength of evidence assessments (mvalues) including the prior belief of 0.95 that fraud was
not present in the account are aggregated and
propagated within the network. As Figure 2 (Step 1)
shows, the updated assessment of belief that fraud is
present in the revenue accounts is Bel(fraud) = 0.049
and the belief that fraud is not present is 0.903. This
implies that unassigned belief (the level of ambiguity)
is 0.048. Thus the plausibility of fraud is assessed to be
0.097. Thus the combination of some fraud triangle risk
factors and some analytical procedures has resulted in a
‘posterior’ fraud risk assessment that should be of
concern to the audit team as it exceeds the 0.05
threshold. Given this assessment, the audit team must
then decide what to do next? The key decisions include
deciding what additional audit procedures need to be
conducted? As will be seen, the framework sketched in
Figure 1 facilitates this assessment greatly.
Figure 2 (Step 2) represents the updated assessment
of beliefs considering specific account schemes. If the
preliminary assessment of fraud risk is at all significant,
the auditor should then evaluate how management
could have perpetrated fraud [2]. Figure 2 (Step 2) lists
several examples of account schemes that have been
used in previous fraud cases as disclosed in SEC
releases [41-43]. The account schemes are classified
into general schemes and specific schemes, and the subassertions of specific schemes are connected through
the “Conditional OR” (CR) relationship to the
assertions of general schemes.
The parameters of the CR relationships are based on
the frequency of the revenue fraud cases as described in

the SEC AAERs issued from 1997 to 2002. Because
of space limitations, details of these relationships are
not provided. However, readers can obtain the details
from the authors. In general, the audit team would
have several other specific fraud schemes to consider,
but to make the illustration simple, we have merged
some of these specific schemes into broader schemes.
During the process of understanding FLIR’s
business and the preliminary assessment of fraud risk,
the auditor may notice some characteristics of FLIR
that could indicate the presence of certain types of
fraud schemes. For example, as described in FLIR’s
1998 annual report, 17.7 percent of FLIR’s revenue
was derived from sales to agencies of the U.S.
government. Some of these sales were contingent.
This piece of evidence suggests a company that is able
to prematurely recognize revenue. We assess the
strength of this evidence, E.AS.1 in Figure 2 (Step 2)
to be at a low level, say 0.1, to support the assertion of
contingent sales.
Throughout 1998, FLIR engaged in a significant
number of bill-and-hold sales, which could indicate a
risk of improperly recognized bill-and-hold sales. We
assess the strength of this evidence (E.AS.2) to be 0.1.
Lastly, compared to 1996 and 1997, FLIR had a
continuous increase in its inventory turnover rate
during 1998, particularly during the third and fourth
quarters indicating that the inventory holding period
was shortened in 1998. This indicates a risk of fraud
scheme related to incomplete inventories. At the same
time, FLIR had a relatively stable accounts receivable
turnover rate. In other words, although inventory
moved faster, the cash collection from sales was not
improving. Both ratios then dropped dramatically in
the first quarter of 1999. We assess the abnormal
increase in the inventory turnover as a risk factor,
represented by E.AP.4, providing support to the
assertion of premature revenue recognition. The
strength is assessed to be 0.05.
After aggregating and propagating the beliefs from
the main assertion to the sub-assertions of account
schemes, we observe from Figure 2 (Step 2) that the
updated plausibility of fraud is 0.124 with belief in
fraud being 0.076. Further, the evidence suggests that
the client is most likely to have committed fraud using
“premature revenue recognition”, with belief of 0.054,
and in particular using premature revenue recognition
on contingent sales, with belief of 0.032. Our
framework shows that the auditor should first perform
audit procedures to evaluate whether premature
revenue recognition has actually occurred
Figure 3 (Step 3) represents the final step in
assessing fraud risk where we consider the evidence
specific to account schemes and evidence schemes. To
improve audit effectiveness and efficiency when
planning audit procedures and audit programs, it
would seem prudent to focus on testing those
assertions where there is the highest belief in fraud.
Performing the kinds of assessments suggested using
our framework has the advantage of providing
rigorous, quantitative risk assessments. As for the
audit of FLIR, the analysis implies that the auditor
should have first assigned more effort to collect and
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evaluate evidence as to whether the company had
recognized revenues prematurely, especially whether
the company had recognized contingent sales
improperly.
When committing fraud, management often uses
evidence schemes to deceive auditors and conceal
fraud. Therefore, when belief in fraud is assessed to be
high, the auditor should not only perform regular
procedures but also procedures for the special purpose
of detecting evidence-based fraud schemes. Figure 3
integrates assertions of specific evidence schemes into
the evidential diagram, and such assertions are
connected to the assertion of revenue recognition on
contingent sales through the CR relationship.
When deciding on the nature of audit tests, auditors
should select those procedures that are relatively more
effective in detecting fraudulent activities related to
high-risk assertions and those that can be effective in
detecting multiple schemes. As indicated in Figure 3,
study of previous fraud cases indicates that clients are
most likely (61 percent) to hide side letters or
agreements with customers from auditors to conceal the
fraud, with collusion with customers and others
occurring 31 percent of the time and forging of
documents 8 percent. Therefore, the planning of audit
programs should focus on those procedures that may be
effective in detecting hidden side letters, then on those
procedures that may be effective in detecting collusions
between client and its customers.
For illustrative purposes, we select several
procedures from a list of procedures that were ranked
by auditors to be effective in detecting high-risk fraud
schemes. The effectiveness of these procedures was
evaluated by the two experienced auditors, a manager
with 9 years of audit experience and a senior with 4
years of audit experience.
In Figure 3, the selected procedures are depicted by
the rectangular boxes on the right hand side. The
assumed level of support for various assertions is given
inside of the evidence boxes. This judgment is based on
the assumption that after performing these audit
procedures, the auditor has evaluated the evidence and
assessed the beliefs regarding the related assertions in
the evidential diagram.
The first procedure given in Figure 3 is sending
confirmations to customers, a standard audit procedure
that provides evidence concerning multiple assertions.
This is a procedure that may help detect the evidence
schemes of using forged documents and of hiding side
letters from auditors.
This procedure was used by FLIR’s auditor to
confirm accounts receivable (A/R) balances. But, the
sales representative who was involved in a $4.1 million
sales transaction which was prematurely recognized by
FLIR and also was involved in the sham shipments of
the incomplete units refused to return the confirmation.
Such a non-response from a customer should have
signaled the auditor that the sale might have been
fraudulent or there could be some disagreements on the
amounts or terms of the sale. As shown in Figure 3, we
assess the strength of the evidence represented by
E.ES.1 to only be 0.4 that related assertions are true.

After assessing the collected evidence with regard
to the related assertions as depicted in Figure 3 and
aggregating the assumed belief values, the updated
belief in fraudulent revenue increases to 0.386, clearly
a high level of belief and a plausibility of 0.418 that
fraud may have occurred. Although just illustrative,
the incorporation of all of the evidence impounded in
Figure 3 and in prior figures implies that the auditor of
FLIR was on tenuous grounds in expressing an
unqualified opinion on the FLIR’s 1998 financial
statements. This conclusion is, of course, consistent
with the results of SEC investigation.
Our framework suggests that an appropriate step in
assessing fraud risk is to take into account how fraud
may have been perpetrated and concealed. To
accomplish this, the audit team would need to
incorporate evidence related to the kinds of evidence
schemes that typically are used and propagate this
evidence throughout the evidential network as
sketched in Figure 1. The analysis results in the
assessments of belief masses as depicted in Figure 3
(Step 3). Specifically, the belief that there is fraud in
the revenue accounts is now 0.386 and the plausibility
of fraud has now risen to 0.418. Clearly the audit team
should be very concerned!
In addition to providing numerical assessments of
fraud risk based on the rigor of belief function
updating, the framework provides some important
information on which schemes the client may have
used to perpetrate fraud. This knowledge should help
direct the auditor to tests that are most likely to be
effective and to a more efficient audit. In the case of
FLIR, given the assumptions we have used as to
strength of evidence, the audit team likely would
benefit most from first investigating hidden sales
agreements (ES.1), then forged sales documents
(ES.3) and finally collusion with customers or third
parties. In fact, these assessments in the FLIR setting
suggest that it is likely that the management may have
used all three evidence schemes to perpetrate fraud
which, in fact, was the actual situation.

6. Summary and conclusion
This paper presents and illustrates a framework to
assess fraud risk and belief in fraud by integrating
fraud risk triangle factors, account-based fraud
schemes and evidence-based fraud schemes using an
evidential reasoning approach based on DS theory.
The framework extends prior models for assessing
fraud risk and the belief in fraud by integrating fraud
schemes and fraud frequency information based on
previous fraud cases disclosed by the SEC. Additional
private fraud information available within each audit
firm can be added to the SEC information to
potentially improve the audit process even more.
Importantly, the framework provides a structured
approach for building connections between risk
assessment, audit program planning, and evaluation of
results.
The approach is illustrated using a real fraud case
which involves preliminary fraud risk assessments,
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audit program planning, evidence aggregation and
evaluation, and a final fraud risk assessment. As
expected, the analysis shows that to improve the
efficiency of fraud detection, auditors should emphasize
audit procedures that are known to be effective in
detecting high-risk fraud schemes.
Our analysis shows that the overall belief in fraud
increases significantly when specific account schemes
are incorporated and corresponding items of evidence
are aggregated. Furthermore, when specific evidence
schemes are incorporated into the evidential diagram
and the corresponding items of evidence are assessed
and aggregated, the overall belief in fraud increases
significantly from 0.076 to 0.386, suggesting with a
high degree of belief that fraud is present in the
reported revenue of FLIR. A similar increase in the
plausibility of fraud is also shown.
As the first attempt to integrate fraud triangle
factors, account fraud schemes and evidence fraud
schemes into the assessment of fraud risk, the suggested
framework is still at a conceptual level and exhibits
several limitations. For example, being based on a
relatively novel theory, the Theory of Belief Functions,
may lead to challenges in gaining academic acceptance.
Also, any scoring scheme you put in place may provide
opportunities and incentives for gaming the system.
The proposed framework also suggests future
research needs. For example, its performance should be
subject to further examinations in additional fraud
cases, in experiments and in practice and in
comparisons with other approaches to fraud risk
assessment such as expert systems and neural networks.
Also, empirical studies could research the frequency
information integrated into the fraud risk assessment
model as to data limitations, such as disclosure bias,
which may affect the accuracy of fraud risk assessment.
As suggested earlier, audit firms should modify the
proposed framework by incorporating their firmspecific experience and knowledge of fraud and of each
particular client. Additional analytical research could
utilize a theorem prover or a model checker to assess
additional framework attributes.
Lastly, our approach provides the audit team with
assessments of both belief in fraud and plausibility of
fraud. While plausibility in fraud assesses the worst
scenario case that fraud could be present, the belief in
fraud which is based on the direct evidence can trigger
further investigations to detect fraud [45]. Thus, both
measures of risk are important; Pl(fraud) measures the
maximum risk and Bel(fraud) triggers further
investigation.
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Figure 1: The General Evidential Diagram for Assessing Belief in Fraud and Plausibility of Fraud
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Figure 2 (Step 1): Updating Client Acceptance: Assessment of Belief in Fraud and Plausibility of Fraud in Revenuesa
E.AP.1 Large
increase of revenue,
with increases of
gross margin and
other profitability
ratios in 1998.
(0.1, 0.0)

E.AP.2 Large
decrease of cash
flow from
operations in
1998.

E.I.1 Pressure to meet earnings
projections and analysts estimates.
(0.1, 0.0)
I. Incentive
(0.126, 0.652)

(0.1, 0.0)
R

E. Prior
Based on
client
acceptance
analysis.
(0.0, 0.95)

*
1

R
F. Fraudulent
Revenue
(0.049, 0.903)

AND

E.AP.3 Abnormal changes in revenue
and profitability ratios in the 4th
quarter of 1998 and 1st quarter of
(0.10, 0.0)
1999

E.I.3 Annual bonus based on pretax profit performance of quarters
and year. (0.1, 0.0)

3

Evidence that relates to Attitude+

A. Attitude
(0.081, 0.689)

R

*

E.I.2 Two major mergers in
1997&1999. (0.05, 0.0)

*
2

O. Opportunity
(0.126, 0.652)

E.O.1 Change of CEO during year
1998. (0.1, 0.0)
E.O.2 International business.
(0.05, 0.0)
E.O.3 Top sales management can
authorize, enter and edit sales
orders. (0.1, 0)

a

The first number in an assertion node represents the overall belief in favor of the assertion and the second number
represents the belief against the assertion. The first number in an evidence node represents the strength of the
evidence in support of the assertion node(s) it is connected to and the second number represents the belief in support
of the negation of the assertion(s).
* The values of R1, R2, R3 are assumed to be at a medium level, say 0.7, in this paper. This means when one fraud
triangle factor (e.g., incentive) is assessed to be present, the related assertions (e.g., attitude and opportunity) will
have a 70 percent chance of being present.
+
No evidence related to attitude of management towards fraud was found in the FLIR Systems, Inc case. The
evidence node is listed here to remind the auditor that he/she should collect and evaluate evidence that may indicate
management’s attitude of committing fraud when such risk factors are evident.
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Evidence from the
initial assessment of
fraud risk in revenue
(from Figure 2 Step 1)
(0.049, 0.902)

F. Fraudulent Revenue
(0.076, 0.876)

CR

AS.3 Improper valuation of
sales revenue; improper
presentation or disclosure
of revenue; or omitted or
improperly deferred sales
(0.010, 0.876)

13%

AS.2 Premature revenue
54% recognition
(0.054, 0.876)

33%

AS.1 Fictitious revenue
(0.025, 0.876)

CR

26%
AS2.3 Revenue
recognition on incomplete
products; revenue
recognition on improper
bill-and-hold sales; or
other premature revenue
recognition
(0.027, 0.876)

AS.2.2 Revenue recognition
on out-of-period sales; or
28% revenue recognition prior to
shipment of goods
(0.015, 0.876)

46%

AS.2.1 Revenue
recognition on contingent
sales
(0.032, 0.876)

E.AP.4 Continuous
decrease of
inventory turnover
and relatively stable
accounts receivable
turnover
(0.05, 0)

E.AS.2 Large
amounts of bill-andhold sales
(0.1, 0)

E.AS.1 A majority
of customers are
agencies and
integrators
(0.1, 0)

Figure 2 (Step 2): Preliminary Assessment of Belief in Fraud and Fraud Risk in Revenue given Specific Account Scheme Evidence
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Evidence from the
initial assessment of
fraud risk in revenue
(from Figure 2 Step 1)
(0.049, 0.902)

F. Fraudulent
Revenue (0.386,
0.582)

CR

AS.3 Improper
valuation of sales
revenue; improper
presentation or
disclosure of
revenue; or omitted
or improperly
deferred sales
(0.050, 0.582)

13%

54% AS.2 Premature
revenue recognition
(0.372, 0.583)

33%

AS.1 Fictitious
revenue
(0.128, 0.582)

CR

E.AP.4
(0.05, 0)

E.AS.2
(0.1, 0)

AS.2.3 Revenue
recognition on
incomplete products;
revenue recognition on
improper bill-and-hold
sales; or other
premature revenue
recognition
(0.142, 0.583)

26%

AS.2.2 Revenue
recognition on out-ofperiod sales; or revenue
28% recognition prior to
shipment of goods
(0.104, 0.583)

46%

AS.2.1 Revenue
recognition on
contingent sales
(0.357, 0.585)

CR

ES.1 Hidden side letters
or agreements with
customers
(0.325, 0.585)

8%

ES.3 Forged sales
invoices; forged
shipment documents or
sham shipments
(0.282, 0.585)

ES.2 Collusions with
customers; collusions
31%
with other third parties;
remove contingent
terms from contracts;
or other evidence
schemes
(0.237, 0.585)

61%

E.S.MR Client representations
to assure the auditor with the
appropriateness of revenue
recognition
(0, 0.05)

(0.1, 0)

E.ES.5 Inconsistent
information among sales,
shipment documents, and
accounting records
(0.2, 0)

E.ES.4 Noticed errors of
shipment information
during on-site observation
of physical take of
inventory
(0.3, 0)

E.ES.3 No subsequent
cash collection for major
sales near year-end
(0.2, 0)

E.ES.2 Large amounts of
product returns during
subsequent period
(0.3, 0)

E.ES.1 No reply to
confirmations or
confirmations with
problems
(0.4, 0)

Figure 3 (Step 3): Final Assessment of Belief in Fraud and Fraud Risk in Revenue Given Evidence Concerning Specific Account Schemes and Evidence
E.AS.1
Schemes
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